A number of theoretical models, loosely characterized under the rubric of behavioral fi nance, suggest that price convergence to value is far from instantaneous and possibly involves interplay between noise and informed traders. These models are motivated by documented anomalous patterns in equity markets and assume some form of psychological bias that affects investor behavior. With the benefit of hindsight it seems clear that the technology sector went through a bubble-like pattern in the late 1990s and that investor biases (if indeed they exist and can be inferred) may have been even more pronounced. Accordingly, our study focuses on the medium-term aftermarket in high-tech US IPOs during this period. Using both ordered logit regression and split-population hazard modeling approaches, we document momentum and reversal patterns that are consistent with the predictions of some behavioral finance models. Our findings indicate that momentum variables are important while fundamental variables have at best weak explanatory power.
Introduction
A number of empirical studies relating to IPOs have documented two persistent so-called anomalies: the initial underpricing and the long-run underperformance of IPO firms. These patterns have been documented in various markets and sample pe riods. 1 The theoretical work has mainly attempted to explain the initial underpricing phenomenon.
2 Some researchers have argued that the long-run underperformance of IPO firms is not a true anomaly and that the results are sensitive to the way in which long-term returns are calculated. 3 Regardless of whether the long-run perfor mance of IPO firms is inferior to or about the same as a control group, there is little doubt that the empirical IPO literature suggests significant initial price momentum and a relatively slow convergence to value.
As a parallel development, the capital markets literature now embraces a more complex view of price discovery. A number of theoretical models, loosely character ized under the rubric of behavioral finance, suggest that price convergence to value is far from instantaneous (or even guaranteed) and possibly involves interplay between noise and informed traders. 4 Most of these models were developed as theoretical un derpinnings to the mounting empirical literature on capital market anomalies that challenged one of the bulwarks of modern finance: the efficient markets hypothesis. However, the issue is far from settled and the debate continues.
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Many securities markets appear to exhibit short-run momentum and long-run re versals. 6 The theories that have emerged to explain this pattern have relied on one or more forms of psychological biases that seemingly influence investor behavior. For instance, Daniel et al. (1998) , hereafter referred to as DHS, theorize that investor overconfidence causes overreaction to private signals, undue self-attribution bias 7 induces the overreaction to continue in the short-run, while the long-run reversal is necessarily implied by the initial overreaction.
In our opinion, the overheated high-tech IPO environment of the late 1990s is an ideal testing ground of the DHS and possibly other behavioral theories. The initial underpricing of IPOs is likely to be even more pronounced for the high-tech subset and an appropriate examination of the aftermarket will uncover momentum and re versal patterns if they exist. Focusing on high-tech IPOs rather than including all technology companies (or simply looking at a market index) has the advantage of a defined starting point for each firm in the sample. Also, we thought it likely that studying the IPO aftermarket has the potential to reveal momentum and/or reversal patterns in months rather than years. In other words, our approach may uncover patterns implied by behavioral finance models like DHS in sharp relief and over a collapsed time period. While the results may not be completely generalizable to a wider sample, we think the benefits of our sample choice outweigh the limitations.
It should be noted that an examination of aftermarket patterns cannot be a di rect test of a particular behavioral finance model. We have chosen to highlight DHS because the overconfidence and self-attribution biases appear to ring true in the context of the previously documented IPO anomalies. Other theories such as those proposed by Shiller (1984) , Barberis et al. (1998) or Hong and Stein (1999) make plausible assumptions about investor behavior and possibly could apply just as well.
Specifically, we examine the medium-term (6-month) aftermarket in high-tech US IPOs launched in the late 1990s. We assume the perspective of an investor who has no preferential allotment and has access only to easily available and virtually costless information in the public domain. As explained above, the sample is deliberately narrowly drawn. Our high-tech IPO firms fall primarily in the following sectors: computer hardware/software, e-commerce, telecommunications and biotechnology. Clearly, these sectors are perceived to have huge potential for future growth and profitability but individual firms and their investors face considerable uncertainty about the viability of their technology and/or business models.
We first employ an ordered logit regression (OLR) approach, which involves set ting up a hierarchy of thresholds of post-IPO market-adjusted returns -this is loosely in the spirit of investor determined price targets. We find that fundamental variables like pre-IPO profitability and age of the company have weak influence at best in explaining post-IPO returns. The aftermarket is driven almost entirely by mo mentum variables. We also document post-IPO overreaction and reversal patterns consistent with the DHS theory. In order to ensure that the results are robust to an alternative estimation procedure, we also implement a split-population hazard (SPH) modeling approach. This yields results broadly consistent with those from the OLR. In Section 2, we outline the research hypotheses and describe the sample and variables used in the study. Section 3 contains a discussion of the OLR method and results. The SPH procedure and results are described in Section 4. The final sec tion contains concluding comments.
Research hypotheses, sample and variable descriptions

Research hypotheses
The essence of the DHS theory in an IPO aftermarket framework is shown in Fig.  1 . Given a favorable private signal, investor overconfidence pushes the stock price above its rational expected level at time 1. (In the context of our application, this would represent Day 1 IPO underpricing.) If public signals are perceived as confirm ing the initial private assessment, self-attribution bias drives the price even higher and further away from the rational level at time 2 (short-run positive momentum in the IPO aftermarket). The arrival of further public information gradually induces the price back toward the fundamental level at time 3 and beyond (reversal of the initial positive momentum). This theoretical framework allows us to formulate the following research hypotheses:
H1. If investor biases along the lines suggested by DHS exist in the post-IPO envi ronment, we should observe aftermarket patterns that exhibit short-run positive momentum and gradual reversal in cumulative market-adjusted returns (CMARs).
H2. IPO aftermarket patterns will be primarily a function of publicly observable momentum variables rather than firm-specific fundamental variables.
Sample description
In executing the study, we assume the perspective of an investor who has no pref erential allotment in the IPO and has access only to freely available information. Our self-imposed constraint is that the investor should be able to implement her strategy without access to large research departments or subscriptions to expensive data bases. Accordingly, our primary sample of high-tech firms was drawn from ipo.com, which lists the universe of US IPOs with dates, offer prices etc. broken down in a number of categories. We chose all IPOs from January 1, 1998 through October 30, 1999 in the following sectors: biotechnology, computer hardware, computer soft ware, electronics, Internet services, Internet software and telecommunications. This resulted in a sample of 301 high-tech IPO firms.
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The Day 1 open price and daily open prices for each firm in the sample and the corresponding NASDAQ index level are downloaded for 125 trading days (�6 months) beyond the IPO date from yahoo finance and edreyfus.com. 9 We decided on a 6 month aftermarket window for a number of reasons. The study is predicated on previous work documenting initial underpricing and long-run underperformance (or at least the lack of superior long-run performance) of IPO firms. The hypothe sized price-value divergence of interest relates to the IPO event and future events such as seasoned offerings or mergers would confound the findings -hence the study period cannot be too long. On the other hand, the period has to be long enough for the anomaly to play out and a meaningful timing strategy implemented from a prac titioner viewpoint. Also, the lockup period after which founders can sell their shares generally expires after 6 months. This may introduce a source of uncertainty in the post 6-month aftermarket that we wanted to avoid. Finally, there was a structural market correction in the technology sector in mid 2000. Given that our high-tech IPO sample runs through October 1999, we felt it was important to avoid any com plicating biases arising from the market correction. All these factors taken together convinced us that a 6-month aftermarket window was the appropriate choice.
Description of variables
To study aftermarket patterns, we decided to adopt a framework that involves setting up a hierarchy of thresholds of post-IPO market-adjusted returns -loosely in the spirit of investor determined price targets. Accordingly, the dependent variable is constructed on the basis of an event, which is defined when the CMAR for a firm crosses a given threshold.
Let P i1 represent the Day 1 open price of the ith firm and let P m1 be the corre sponding level of the market (Nasdaq) index. Similarly, P it and P mt represent the open price at time t of the ith firm and the market respectively. The CMAR of the firm at time t is calculated as
The time in question does not refer to calendar time, but to the time from the IPO date. We use 25%, 50%, and 100% as thresholds for the OLR and SPH models. For instance, an event occurs when the CMAR it exceeds 50%. The following categories are useful in explaining the construction of the dependent variable for the OLR and SPH models. Each category represents the best possible return in the 6-month period beyond the IPO date. For instance, for Category 4, a return greater than 100% (>1) is not possible. It may appear to the reader that the manner in which we construct our thresholds that define the ordered categories or even the number of categories is somewhat ad hoc. This is quite true but far from being a shortcoming, this is actually an advan tage in the context of our application. It allows the individual investor to set her own bar in terms of CMAR expectation while the model itself is flexible enough to ac commodate (within reason) any number of categories.
The crucial issues that we address in this paper are as follows: What is the prob ability that an average firm's market adjusted returns will cross a given threshold? How does this probability change over time in the 6-month IPO aftermarket? (see H1 above). Does this probability depend on fundamental or momentum variables? (see H2 above). It is worth noting that while we draw upon the DHS framework to formulate our research questions, the theory itself seeks to provide a general ex planation of market under-and overreactions and does not provide direction on the choice of proxy variables for particular applications. Accordingly, potential explan atory variables, X , are selected with guidance from the empirical IPO literature and researcher intuition. The data sources used are ipo.com, FISonline, Hoovers.com, and Carter et al. (1998) . The variables and our rationale for their selection are described below: Positive or the date the firm was incorporated to the IPO date.
no effect A fundamental variable that is a weak proxy for firm quality Table 1 provides a comparison between the distribution of firms across the five categories if the investor always cashes out at the point when the threshold is reached versus the distribution that results if a simple 6-month 'buy and hold' (BH) strategy is adopted. It should be noted that 'selling at the threshold' (ST) is based on perfect hindsight and that BH is a na€ ıve strategy that involves buying every IPO stock at the Day 1 open price and selling it after six months. Nonetheless, the contrast is striking. With the ST strategy, 112 firms (37.2% of the total) end up in category 5 (CMAR exceeding 100%) whereas only 54 firms (17.9% of the total) achieve the same result under BH. Also, the numbers of firms ending up in category 1 (negative CMAR) are 48 (15.9% of total) for the ST versus 170 (56.5% of total) for the BH strategy. The advantage of ST over BH is even more compelling when the mean CMARs are examined. In Table 2 , we present the CMARs associated with holding on to the position for 6-months instead of cashing out at the point when the threshold is reached. For instance in category C4, the ST strategy would garner mean CMARs between 50% and 100% by construction (61.39% to be exact). However, if the long position in the 54 firms that make it to C4 under the ST strategy were maintained for 6-months, the mean CMAR shrinks to )4.70%. For C3, the swing is from 31.06% to )26.17%. The mean 6-month returns represent the returns to investors who hold on to the long position for 6 months instead of ST. In category C4, the ST strategy would garner a mean market-adjusted return of between 50 and 100% by construction (61.39% to be exact). However, if the long position in the 54 firms that make it to C4 under the ST strategy were maintained for 6-months, the mean market-adjusted return shrinks to )4.70%. Tables 1 and 2 indicate that for all firms in categories C2 and above (253 firms representing 84% of the sample), the aftermarket CMAR exhibits momentum and many of the firms suffer a reversal within a 6-month period. The explanatory vari ables defined above may capture aftermarket momentum effects but not reversala phenomenon that is central to our inquiry. Therefore, we construct two additional (artificial) variables for the OLR model. The first such variable (time) represents the time in weeks from the IPO date to the optimal sell date (defined as the date the threshold is reached, not necessarily the peak stock price) and the second variable is simply time squared to capture the implicit non-linearity (or reversal). We fully realize that these two variables involve ex post look back and cannot be used in a pure predictive model. However, as dis cussed in the following OLR results section, we will show that it is possible to sim ulate the effect of the time variables to estimate the probabilities of ending up in the various categories by evaluating the other non-look back variables.
Ordered logit regression model and results
OLR methodology
We execute an OLR in which the dependent variable is based on the CMAR it . OLR models are useful when the dependent variable represents an outcome of a de cision between a finite set of alternatives that are naturally ordered (see Greene, 2000) . Examples include opinion surveys (strongly agree, agree, disagree and strongly disagree), insurance coverage (full, partial, none), bond ratings, etc. In this application, a firm's aftermarket IPO performance falls into one of the five ordered categories defined above. The OLR model seeks to explain the influence of variables on the probability of the firm falling into these categories.
Consider
where Y j , representing category j above, equals 1 if CMAR it exceeds some threshold value; 0 otherwise. For instance, for Category 5,
The above categories are defined when the threshold is first reached. At this point, the time variable defined as the number of weeks after the IPO date is also recorded. For instance if the firm's CMAR becomes 100% in 20 trading days, Y 5 equals 1 and the time variable takes on value 4. For the worst category (Y 1 ¼ 1) the adjusted return is never positive and the time variable is set equal to zero.
In the estimation process, consider an underlying performance variable (Z) that is continuous but only the discrete response is observed. Also, consider the following grid that slots firms in to the various categories:
For an ordered logit model,
The coefficient b j measures the influence of the explanatory variable X j on the probability of falling into a particular category. The c's are the unknown parameters to be estimated along with the b's. These probabilities are used to specify the follow ing log-likelihood function that is maximized to obtain the parameter estimates:
i¼1 j¼1
X X
The results of the OLR are reported in Table 4 . It should be noted that the inter pretation of the coefficients in an OLR is not straightforward. However, in our ap plication, a significantly positive coefficient implies that the variable positively influences the probability of a good outcome from the investor's point of view, i.e., the probability that the CMAR will end up in category 4 (50-100% range) or 5 (>100% range) and vice versa.
Discussion of OLR results
The hypothesized momentum and reversal effects are strongly confirmed. Both momentum (biased self-attribution) proxy variables: the IPO firm's average mar ket-adjusted return and the average market (Nasdaq) return in the first week following the IPO have positive and highly significant coefficients. Further, the time and timesquared variables are also strongly significant with positive and negative coefficients respectively. In the context of the DHS price formation theory, overconfident inves tors cause stock prices to overreact initially (the jump from offer to market open price), biased self-attribution potentially induced by upward movement in the IPO firm's stock price and the market generally in the week following the IPO causes a further overreaction (the continuation of positive returns implied by our momentum variables) and the eventual reversal sets in as price-value convergence is induced with the continual arrival of public information (inferred from our time-squared variable and the patterns documented in Tables 1 and 2 ). From the speculative in vestor's point of view, it pays to hold the stock for a while in the initial period after the IPO because the probability of landing in the higher categories is improving but as more time passes, this probability wanes.
Also, as hypothesized, fundamental variables do not appear to influence the IPO aftermarket. For instance, the profitability (or lack thereof) of the firm measured as net income/revenue in the pre-IPO year has no effect. Similarly, the number of years that the firm has been in business prior to the IPO (age before the IPO) does not seem to matter. These are classic 'old-economy' variables that supposedly enable forma tion of expectations about future cash flows and/or risk. Also, the extent of initial underpricing (measured as the percentage price change from the IPO offer price to the Day 1 open market price) does not play a role in the aftermarket. Perhaps the IPO offer price in conjunction with the first available market price (Day 1 open) sub sumes other fundamental information (such as profitability and firm age) contained in the prospectus and therefore these variables ought not to affect aftermarket prices in an efficient markets framework. However, a less benign explanation is that mo mentum investors, for whom fundamental variables do not matter, dominate the im mediate aftermarket.
Some variables related to the IPO contract do seem to matter. Underwriter repu tation 11 (contrary to our prior) and the presence of a green shoe provision are asso ciated with positive aftermarket returns while the offer size appears to have no effect. Within the high-tech umbrella, designation as an Internet firm is associated with pos itive aftermarket returns; other industry dummy variables are insignificant.
It is worth exploring the underwriter reputation variable a little further. We had expected that it would be negatively related to aftermarket returns -the logic being that highly ranked underwriters would set a more accurate offer price and a percep tion of fairer pricing would dampen aftermarket biases. In fact earlier studies do sug gest that initial underpricing (or the amount of money left on the table by the IPO firm) is inversely related to underwriter reputation (see Carter et al., 1998) . But this relationship seems to have flipped (turned positive) in the 1990s and especially in the 1999-2000 period (see Loughran and Ritter, 2002b, Table 7 ). Why should this be the case? Loughran and Ritter (2002b) propose two hypotheses: (a) ''the analyst cover age hypothesis'' -the idea here is that the issuing firm places more importance on snagging a lead underwriter with a highly ranked analyst to cover the firm and downplays underpricing; and (b) ''the corruption hypothesis'' -this refers to side pay ments made by the underwriter to founders and senior executives of the issuing firm usually in the form of allocation of shares in other hot IPOs.
We think that these hypotheses are compatible with the DHS theory and our own findings. The source of investor overconfidence and self-attribution biases particu larly in technology stocks could well have been less-than-objective sell-side analyst recommendations serving as public signals. Numerous recent stories in the business press have reported on the conflicts of interests and the breaching of Chinese walls between the brokerage-advice and investment banking divisions at major Wall Street firms.
12 If anything, underwriter incentives are served firstly through underpricing but also by propping up the price in the aftermarket so that their preferred clients can bail out in an orderly manner.
We do not wish to convey the impression that the DHS theory is the only expla nation for the momentum/reversal patterns that we document in the high-tech IPO aftermarket. It is however a reasonably convincing theoretical framework within which it is possible to formulate and empirically test hypotheses, as we have at tempted to do in this study. There are a number of other theories that also attempt to explain generally the less-than-efficient market reaction to various types of events. For instance Hong and Stein (1999) postulate two classes of investors: momentum investors who chase price trends and ignore fundamental information causing price overreactions in the process; and news watchers who use fundamental information but ignore prices and are thereby the source for underreactions. It is possible that the IPO aftermarket patterns that we detect could be explained in such a frame work. 13 The DHS theory does have the advantage of being grounded in psycholog ical biases that have been verified in experimental settings. In our opinion, it would be difficult if not impossible to design an empirical study using capital market data to directly test any of the behavioral finance theories.
Our OLR model cannot be used in a traditional predictive sense because the time variable is constructed using ex post look back. However, it is possible to simulate the probabilities of various outcomes for different values of the time variable. In Fig. 2 , we report the results of the simulation analysis that generates predicted pro portions for categories 4 and 5 combined (market-adjusted returns in excess of 50%) with respect to time expressed in number of weeks, and the other explanatory vari ables at their actual ex ante values for each firm. The simulated proportions (or probabilities) are averaged across our sample of 301 high-tech IPO firms.
The probability of earning market-adjusted returns of at least 50% increases over time, peaks at around 14 weeks from the IPO date and wanes thereafter. It is impor tant to note that the probabilities reported in Fig. 2 are conditional on the time vari able taking on a positive value. As indicated earlier, the value of the time variable is determined when the ordered threshold is crossed but takes on a value of zero if the firm never does cross any positive market-adjusted return threshold, i.e., ends up being a category 1 firm. Therefore, in determining the cash-out point with ex-ante simulation, the probability estimates that the model generates are overstated. The These results are broadly comparable with raw data. The raw mean of the time vari able corresponding to each category is given by 0 weeks for C1, 3.8 weeks for C2, 8.1 weeks for C3, 12.7 weeks for C4, and 9.6 weeks for C5.
pattern of the probability numbers (but not the numbers themselves) is the salient information to be drawn from Fig. 2 .
Split-population hazard model and results
SPH methodology
As mentioned earlier, the time variable in our OLR model is constructed artifi cially with the benefit of ex post look back. We use an alternative statistical tech nique to endogenize the influence of 'time' and also to check how well the aftermarket patterns hold up. Hazard rate models are often employed to explain the duration of an event of interest (see Greene, 2000) . In this paper, we define an event when the CMAR crosses a certain threshold. A hazard rate model is used to capture the effect of various factors on the instantaneous probability that a given threshold is crossed. Further, it also enables us to capture the timing issue by ana lyzing how this probability changes over time.
Standard hazard rate models are implicitly based on the assumption of certain exit implying that the event will eventually be defined. However, since an IPO invest ment may not always lead to the market-adjusted threshold returns of 25%, 50%, or 100%, we use a SPH model (see Bandopadhyaya and Jaggia (2001) for details) that takes into account the possibility that for some firms the exit may never occur. We run three separate SPH models (for thresholds of 25%, 50%, and 100%) where the hazard parameters are estimated along with a split parameter that represents the probability of eventual success.
We observe two kinds of firms: (a) firms that reach the threshold (complete obser vations) and (b) firms that do not reach the threshold (censored observations). Let a censoring variable C equal 1 for complete and 0 for censored observations. In stan dard hazard rate models the contribution of complete and censored observations, conditional on the X 's, at time t are P ðT ¼ tÞ and P ðT > t i ) respectively. In an SPH model, the contributions are dP ðT ¼ t i ) and 1 d þ dP ðT > t i Þ respectively where d represents the probability of eventual success. We use a log-logistic hazard function given by
, and a is the shape parameter of the hazard that determines the point after which the hazard declines. It is useful to note that if a variable has a positive impact on the hazard, then it has a negative impact on the time it takes to reach a threshold. The log-likelihood function for an SPH is
where w ¼ b 0 X þ a ln t and C is a censoring variable. The split parameter d allows the probability of eventual success to be different from one and if the estimated d is not significantly different from 1, the split model converges to a standard hazard model.
SPH model results and discussion
The results from the SPH regressions for market-adjusted return thresholds of 25%, 50%, and 100% respectively are presented in Table 5 . We observe that they are generally consistent with those obtained from the OLR procedure. The momen tum variables -the firm's average market-adjusted return and the average market (Nasdaq) return in the first week following the IPO -are significant and positively influence the hazard (instantaneous probability of reaching the specified threshold given that it has not been achieved up to the previous instant) for all three thresh olds. Also, the shape parameter a is strongly significant and greater than one for all thresholds. Recall that this parameter in the hazard-modeling context indicates how 'elapsed time' plays a role in explaining the hazard over time. In our application, given the log-logistic specification, the a estimate indicates that the hazard increases initially, reaches a peak and then begins to wane. The hypothesized momentumreversal aftermarket patterns are unequivocally confirmed by the SPH modeling approach. ' and '' denote significance at 5% and 10% level respectively. For a and d, the t-statistic is evaluated at 1. The regression coefficients capture the influence of the factors on the hazard. The shape parameter a determines the point after which the hazard declines. The split parameter d represents the probability of eventual success.
The fundamental variables, net income/revenue and age before the IPO, are gener ally insignificant as we found under OLR; the one exception is that net income/rev enue is weakly significant for the 50% threshold. The influence of the other explanatory variables is broadly in line with the OLR findings. The underwriter rep utation variable is positively associated with the hazard in all cases and highly signif icant for the 25% and 100% thresholds. Similarly, the green shoe and the Internet industry dummy variable coefficients are positive as before but significant only in two out of three cases. One difference in the SPH findings is that the underpricing variable (percentage price change) has the hypothesized negative sign and is signifi cant in two out three cases. This indicates that the higher the extent of initial under pricing the lower the probability of crossing the aftermarket threshold. In the OLR estimation, this coefficient was negative although insignificant. Duration in Weeks Fig. 3 . Aggregate hazard of the split-population log-logistic models for the 25%, 50%, and 100% thresh olds. The aggregate hazard is calculated for the estimated SPH models with the factors evaluated at their mean value.
The lack of complete concordance between OLR and SPH is not really surprising given that they are non-nested statistical procedures involving maximum likelihood estimation. We are pleased to note that regardless of the procedure, our hypotheses regarding aftermarket patterns and the dominance of momentum over fundamental variables hold up very well.
SPH yields an additional insight, i.e., the probability that the threshold will be reached eventually though not necessarily within 6 months. This point estimate is captured by the split parameter d, which is strongly significant for the 25 (d ¼ 0:826) and 100 (d ¼ 0:708)% thresholds. 14 In Fig. 3 , we plot the aggregate hazard against duration in weeks from the IPO date. We observe that the hazard ramps up in the initial weeks, reaches a peak and then declines. For the 50% (100%) threshold, the peak is reached at around 5 (13) weeks, which also represents the optimal cash-out points averaged across our sample. Recall from Fig. 2 that the OLR procedure indicated that the simulated probability of reaching a threshold of 50% or better (combined probabilities for the C4 and C5 categories) reached a maximum at 14 weeks. The broad aftermarket patterns of momentum and reversal are revealed under both modeling approaches.
Note that the aggregate hazard function for the 25% threshold has a more pro nounced inverted U shape with the peak reached just 2 weeks after the IPO date and a fairly rapid fall-of thereafter. By contrast, the hazard functions for the 50% and 100% thresholds rise and fall more gently with the peaks reached at a lower point than the 25% threshold. This fits with the intuitive expectation that a lower threshold strategy can be executed relatively quickly with a higher probability of suc cess. The required holding period increases with the threshold while the probability of actually reaching the threshold declines, as would be the case with any speculative investment strategy.
A recent paper by Aggarwal et al. (2002) presents an interesting model where managers strategically underprice IPOs to maximize wealth by selling shares at lock up expiration. In their model, initial underpricing generates momentum, which pre sumably lasts through the lockup expiration date. While our study does not explicitly control for the lockup expiration, we limit our aftermarket analysis to six months beyond the IPO date. And as discussed above, the momentum lasts for only a few weeks before the reversal sets in. Unless the lockup expiration is well below six months (which seems unlikely) for the firms in our sample, our results would appear to contradict the prediction of their model. On the other hand, managers would not care about market-adjusted returns but simply raw returns and we have not consid ered unconditional momentum-reversal patterns based on unadjusted aftermarket prices.
Conclusion
In this paper, we study the 6-month aftermarket in high-tech US IPOs launched in the late 1990s. We draw on the DHS theoretical framework of investor overconfi dence and biased self-attribution to hypothesize short-run positive momentum and gradual reversal in post IPO returns. Both our methodological approaches (OLR and SPH) confirm these patterns. We also find that momentum variables explain most of the aftermarket price behavior while fundamental indicators have weak influence at best.
At this stage, we are unsure if our results can be replicated with a broader sam ple and in a more benign investment climate than the late 1990s. Our sense is that while our narrowly drawn sample may exhibit somewhat more extreme character istics, the long-standing IPO underpricing anomaly is likely to portend similar if more muted IPO aftermarket patterns. A number of regulatory changes have oc curred in recent years. The effective repeal of Glass-Steagall has resulted in signif icant consolidation in Wall Street firms -the merger of Citicorp with Salomon Smith Barney (via the Travelers Group) being a case in point. Market observers have noted that this development may have exacerbated the potential for conflicts of interest. Also, stock exchanges in the US (and in many other countries) relaxed listing requirements enabling firms with limited track records to launch IPOs. So it is entirely possible that empirical results obtained with data from the 1990s (and particularly the late 1990s) may not carry over to earlier periods -the Loughran and Ritter (2002b) paper clearly suggests this in the context of IPO underpricing and the underlying factors. 15 We believe that the IPO aftermarket is a fertile area for empirical analysis. As the finance literature embraces a more nuanced view of market efficiency, there may be unique opportunities to test the predictions of various theories that admit psycholog ical biases in investor behavior. The late 1990s will also afford researchers the ability to gain insights into how investor biases can be exploited by opportunistic agents (be they financial intermediaries or insider-managers) in a bubble-like environment. Ap propriately designed studies will not only deepen our understanding of market be havior but also inform the public policy debate in the areas of corporate governance, investor protection and securities law reform.
